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ARGUMENT
I. The Court Should Reject 4Life's Arguments That Nu-Med's
Claims Are Barred By Rule 13.
4Life has attempted to present this Court with several different arguments suggesting
that Nu-Med's claims in this case should be barred by Rule 13. These arguments, however,
continue to ignore the plain language ofRules 13 and 41, and for the reasons discussed more
fully below, Nu-Med contends that 4Life's arguments should all be rejected by the Court, and
the trial court's dismissal of Nu-Med's claims should be reversed.
A. The Fact That Ulrich's Claims Proceeded To Trial Is
Not Relevant To The Issues On Appeal.
A common theme throughout 4Life's arguments is the suggestion that the fact that
claims between Paul Ulrich and 4Life ultimately proceeded to trial in the prior litigation is
somehow relevant to the issue ofwhether Rule 13 prohibits Nu-Med from pursuing its own
separate claims against 4Life in the present case. More specifically, 4Life suggests that
because there was some similarity between one of Ulrich's counterclaims against 4Life and
one of Nu-Med's counterclaims against 4Life in the prior litigation, then Nu-Med should
have been required under Rule 13 to have litigated its claims against 4Life in the trial that
went forward between Ulrich and 4Life. Nothing in Rule 13, however, even remotely
suggests that multiple claimants who may have similar or overlapping claims against a single
defendant (or counter-defendant in this case) are required to pursue their claims in the same
case and in a single trial.
While there may arguably be some benefit for purposes of judicial economy in
requiring multiple claimants with similar claims against a single defendant to pursue those
claims in a single case, the Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah law simply do not require it.
Forexample, if two passengers in the same vehicle are injured when that vehicle is struck
by a negligent driver, those two passengers would be entitled to pursue separate lawsuits
against the negligent driver for injuries sustained inthe accident. In fact, even if one ofthe
injured passengers had already fully litigated his claims through trial against the negligent
driver, nothing would prohibit theother injured passenger from then initiating hisownclaim
against the negligent driver solong as the applicable statute oflimitation had not yetexpired.
Thus, underthat scenario, it is entirely possible andallowable under the lawforthe negligent
driver to be faced withhavingto defend himselfin two separate cases that both arose out of
a single incident. There is certainly nothing in Rule 13 that would prohibit that type of
scenario. Rule 13 applies solely to"counterclaims" and"cross-claims", neither ofwhich are
involved in thisexample. Nothing inRule 13 suggests thattherule was intended to prevent
multiple claimants from pursuing separate actions against a single defendant, even when
those actions may arise out of the same underlying facts or involve similar claims.
While the prior litigation between Nu-Med and 4Life involved claims and
counterclaims running between Nu-Med and 4Life, and also involved separate claims and
counterclaims running between 4Life and Ulrich, there were absolutely no claims,
counterclaims or cross-claimsof anytype running betweenNu-Med and Ulrich. Therefore,
there was nothing under Rule 13 which required that Nu-Med's claims against 4Life be
pursued and tried inthe same case with Ulrich's claims against 4Life. The fact that Nu-Med
and Ulrich each had claims against 4Life arising out of some of the same facts makes their
situation analogous to the injured passengers in the above-stated example. If4Life had never
filed claims against Nu-Med in the prior litigation, Nu-Med would have still had grounds to
bring its tortious interference claim against 4Life based on 4Life's interference with the
Ulrich/Nu-Med contract, and it would have been entirely permissible for Nu-Med to bring
those claims in a separate matter from the 4Life v. Ulrich lawsuit even though Ulrich's
claims against 4Life included a similar tortious interference claim.
The only factor that forced Nu-Med to initially bring its claims against 4Life as
counterclaims in the prior litigation is the fact that 4Life filed its claims against Nu-Med in
that case. Thus, as Nu-Med has acknowledged, Nu-Med was initially required by Rule 13
to file its claims against 4Life as counterclaims in the prior litigation, and Nu-Med fully
complied with that requirement. This requirement, however, had absolutely nothing to do
with the fact that Ulrich also had a similar tortious interference claim pending against 4Life
in that same case. The sole reason that Nu-Med was initially compelled to file its
counterclaims in the prior litigation was to ensure, as required by Rule 13, that all claims
running between Nu-Med and 4Life were litigated in the same action and not separate cases.
With regards to the stated policy reasons behind Rule 13, 4Life has cited excerpts
from court opinions dealingwith Rule 13 to suggest that Nu-Med was somehowcompelled
by Rule 13 to litigate its claims against 4Life in the same action and at the same trial where
Ulrich litigated his claims against 4Life. For example, 4Life cites language from this Court's
prior decision in Raile Family Trust v. Promax Dev. Corp.. 24 P.3d 980 (Utah 2001), wherein
the Court stated that"[t]he purpose ofRule 13(a) is toensure that allrelevant claims arising
outofa given transaction are litigated inthe same action." IcL at 983. That case, however,
did not involve multiple claimants with similar claims against a single defendant, nordid it
suggest in any way that Rule 13 extends to cases involving multiple claimants against a
single defendant or requires that the multiple claimants all litigate their claims against that
defendant ina single action. Instead, Raile Family Trust dealt with issues involving a single
plaintiff (Promax) and asingle defendant (the Raile Family Trust), and the Court examined
the issue of whether the Raile Family Trust was required by Rule 13 to bring any claims it
had against Promax in the initial suit filed by Promax where the Raile Family Trust had failed
to allege any counterclaims. IcL 981-82. While Raile Family Trust clearly establishes that
Rule 13 is intended to ensure that all claims and potential counterclaims running between a
plaintiff and defendant are litigated together in the same action, the case had absolutely
nothing to do with the separate issue ofwhether multiple claimants should be required to
litigate similar claims against a single defendant in the same action.
While Rule 13 and the cases dealing with Rule 13 do not extend to situations
involving multiple claimants bringing similar claims against a single defendant, there is a
separate procedural rule that expressly deals with such scenarios. Rule 42 ofboth the Utah
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a trial court may consolidate separately
filed cases which involve "common questions of law or fact." Thus, if Nu-Med and Ulrich
had filed separate tortious interference suits against 4Life in the same court, the court would
have had the option of consolidating the cases under Rule 42 into a single case. It is
important to note, however, that such consolidation is not mandatory under Rule 42, and is
something which is initiated by motion of one of the parties. Thus, it is clear under Rule 42
that if a motion is not filed, or if the court chooses not to consolidate the cases, then it is
entirely permissible under the rules for parties such as Nu-Med and Ulrich to pursue their
similar claims against 4Life in separate actions.
It is also interesting to note that Rule 42(b) of the Utah and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure actually gives a trial judge the option of separating certain claims, counterclaims,
and cross-claims that are pending in a single action, and ordering separate trials when the
court deems it appropriate. This rule seems to acknowledge that while judicial economy may
be one important consideration, there are other considerations as well, and in some cases it
may be appropriate and even preferred to have separate trials for claims arising out of the
same underlying facts.
The present litigation and the prior litigation between Nu-Med and 4Life did not
present the trial courts with issues and arguments based on Rule 42. Rule 42 is persuasive,
however, in countering 4Life's attempts to suggest that Nu-Med's claims in this case should
be deemed barred because the claims and counterclaims running between 4Life and Ulrich
proceeded to trial in the prior litigation.
The Court's focus in this appeal should be solely on the claims and counterclaims
running between Nu-Med and 4Life, and the Court should not be distracted or misled by the
fact that Ulrich's separate counterclaims against 4Life in the prior litigation proceeded to
trial. It is worth noting that while there is certainly an overlap and similarity in the tortious
interference counterclaims which Nu-Med and Ulrich alleged against 4Life in the prior
litigation, Nu-Med and Ulrich also had other separate counterclaims against 4Life which
were not similar and did not overlap. For example, Nu-Med also stated causes of action for
abuse of process, wrongful bringing of civil proceedings, and bad faith wherein Nu-Med
alleged that 4Life had absolutely no basis for dragging Nu-Med into its legal dispute with
Ulrich. (R. 60-82). Ulrich's counterclaims against 4Life in the prior litigation did not
include these causes of action. Ulrich's counterclaims did include other causes of action,
however, which were entirely separate and distinct from those alleged byNu-Med, including
claims ofdefamation and breach ofcontract, both ofwhich were ultimately submitted to the
jury together with Ulrich's tortious interference claim. (R. 7, 21).
Thus, while there was some limited overlap between Nu-Med's claims against 4Life
and Ulrich's claims against 4Life, there were also some significant differences between the
types of claims being made that weighed in favor of separating Nu-Med's claims from
Ulrich's claims for purposes oftrial. Had Nu-Med been compelledto continue litigating its
claims against 4Life together with Ulrich, the trial which was held would have been
considerably longer, and the scope of issues and potential damages being submitted to the
jury would have been greatlywidened, therebycreatinga substantialrisk of confusionofthe
issues amongst the jury during the course of a multi-weektrial. It could be argued that this
is precisely the type of case where it would have made sense to separate Nu-Med's claims
against 4Life from Ulrich's claims against 4Life under Rule 42(b), especially when all of
4Life's original claims against Nu-Med had been dismissed before trial.
While Judge Jenkins never specifically referenced Rule 42 during the course of the
pre-trial conferences in the priorlitigation, this may have been the type of consideration he
was making when he specifically asked Nu-Med's counsel whether Nu-Med intended to
pursue itscounterclaims against 4Life if4Life's claims against Nu-Med were tobedismissed
on summary judgment. (R. 86-90). As noted in the prior openingbriefs filed by the parties,
Nu-Med's counsel responded bystating that Nu-Med would be willing to voluntarily dismiss
the counterclaims without prejudice if the court dismissed 4Life's claims against Nu-Med.
In the end, that is preciselywhat happened. Judge Jenkins dismissed4Life's claims against
Nu-Med on summary judgment, and then exercised his discretion under Rule 41(a)(2) by
allowing Nu-Med to voluntarily dismiss its counterclaims without prejudice. In doing so,
Judge Jenkins shortened what was already scheduled to be a multi-week jury trial, and
significantly narrowed and simplified the issues that would be submitted to the jury in the
trial between Ulrich and 4Life.
4Life has repeatedly attempted to stress judicial economy as the reason why Nu-Med
should be barred from attempting to pursue its claims in the present litigation. As noted
above, however, there are many other factors which also need to be considered. There would
have been advantages and disadvantages for all parties and the courts ifNu-Med had chosen
or been compelled to remain in the prior litigation to pursue its claims against 4Life in the
same trial where 4Life and Ulrich litigated their various disputes. In the end, however, there
is nothing in the Rules which bound Nu-Med's claims to Ulrich's claims, or which prohibited
Nu-Med from voluntarily dismissing its claims simply because claims between Ulrich and
4Life were proceeding on to trial. Since nothing in the plain language ofthe Rules required
that Nu-Med litigate its claims together with Ulrich, and since the Rules actually permit
claimants to pursue such claims in separate actions unless consolidated by the court under
Rule 42, the Court should entirely disregard the fact that the claims between Ulrich and 4Life
were tried separately, and should focus its analysis solely on the claims running between Nu-
Med and 4Life.
B. 4Life Has Failed to Establish Any Conflict Between
Rules 41 and 13 Which Should Lead the Court to
Look Beyond the Plain Language of the Rules.
Another common theme throughout 4Life's arguments isthe suggestion that there is
a conflict between Rule 13 and Rule 41, and therefore, the Court must delve into principles
of statutory construction to determine which Rule takes priority. As shown in Nu-Med's
opening brief, however, there is only aconflict between Rule 13 and Rule 41 ifthe Court
applies the Rules in the manner being proposed by 4Life. More specifically, the potential
conflict between Rule 13 and Rule 41 arises only if the Court concludes that Rule 13
continues to apply to claims that were originally filed as counterclaims even when the
underlying claims filed against the counterclaimant have all been fully resolved by summary
judgment or some other means. Nu-Med submits that this Court should reject 4Life's
strained interpretation ofthe Rules which ignores the plain language ofthe Rules, and forces
this Court to address issues ofstatutory construction that are generally reserved for rules and
statutes that truly are in conflict.
Under 4Life's proposed principles of statutory construction, 4Life suggests that the
Court should conclude that Rule 13 trumps Rule 41 because 4Life believes Rule 13 to be the
more "specific" provision. Nu-Med contends, however, that Rule 41 is actually the more
specific provision with respect to the issues presented in this appeal, and therefore, even if
the Court were to find a conflict between the Rules, it should be Rule 41 which prevails. The
language establishing the scope of voluntary dismissals under Rule 41 does not speak of
claims and counterclaims in general terms as suggested by 4Life, but rather very clearly and
specifically states in a separate subparagraph that the provisions of Rule 41 "apply to the
dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim." Rule 41(c) (emphasis
added). It is difficult to imagine how this provision could be any more clear or specific.
There is no question that the drafters of this Rule intended for the Rule to apply to all types
ofcounterclaims, including compulsory counterclaims filed pursuant to Rule 13. Therefore,
while Nu-Med contends that there is no conflict between Rule 41 and Rule 13, Nu-Med also
submits that Rule 41 is the more specific provision with respect to the issues presented on
appeal, and thus, would trump Rule 13 if a conflict were found to exist.
4Life also attempts to suggest that its proposed interpretation ofRule 41 and Rule 13
is the "prevailing approach" adopted by courts around the country. A closer review ofthose
cases cited by 4Life in support of this so-called prevailing approach reveals that most ofthe
cases are simply not on point with the issues presented in this appeal, and do not involve
situations where counterclaimants attempted to voluntarily dismiss their claims onlyafterthe
underlying claims against the counterclaimant had all been dismissed or otherwise resolved.
See Stern v. Whitlach& Co.. 631 N.E.2d 680 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Lenihan v. Shumaker.
No. 12814, 1987 WL 10916, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 6693 (Ohio Ct. App., May 6, 1987);
Clements v. Austin, 673 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
The only case cited by4Life with facts that are arguably analogous tothe present case
is Grynberg v. Phillips, 148 P.3d 446 (Colo. App. 2006), a recent decision issued by the
Court ofAppeals ofColorado. While the facts ofthat case may besomewhat analogous, Nu-
Med submits that the Colorado court's opinion fails to even address the plain language of
Rule 41, and specifically the provision that allows for the voluntary dismissal of "any"
counterclaim without prejudice. It is Nu-Med's position that the Arkansas Supreme Court
decision addressed in Nu-Med's opening Brief is the better reasoned approach, and is the
case which shouldbe followed bythisCourt. See Linnv.NationsBank, 14S.W.3d500(Ark.
2000).
Interestingly, the Colorado Court ofAppeals referenced Linn inits Grynberg decision,
but rejected the approach followed by Arkansas Supreme Court, stating simply that
"Arkansas' procedural rules are substantially different from the federal, Colorado, and
Wyoming rules." Grynberg, 148 P.3d at 449. The Colorado court fails to point out any
specific differences in those procedural rules, however. While the versions ofRule 41 in
effect in Colorado, Wyoming and Arkansas all have some stylistic differences, it is Nu-
Med's position that the rules are all substantively the same, and most importantly, the Rule
41 ineffect ineach ofthese states specifically includes aprovision stating thattheprovisions
of Rule 41 are applicable to "any counterclaim." Grynberg. however, unlike Linn,
completely ignores this provision, and fails to offer any explanation for doing so.
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4Life also attempts to suggest that the Arkansas version of Rule 41 is substantively
different from the Utah version because the Arkansas version contains a provision which
grants a counterclaimant the "right" to continue pursuing his counterclaims in the original
litigation even if the plaintiff elects to voluntarily dismiss its original claims against the
counterclaimant. 4Life erroneously suggests that the Utah version of Rule 41 does not
contain a comparable provision. In subparagraph (a)(2)(ii) of Utah's Rule 41, a
counterclaimant is granted the same right that is granted in the Arkansas version of the rule.
Specifically, under Rule 41(a)(2)(ii) of the Utah Rules ofCivil Procedure, "counterclaimfs]
can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court" even after a plaintiff moves
for a voluntary dismissal of claims under Rule 41. Interestingly, the use of the word "can"
in this provision clearly suggests that it is not mandatory for the counterclaims to remain
pending in that action for adjudication by that court. Thus, Nu-Med contends that the express
language in 41(a)(2)(ii) offers further support to Nu-Med's claim that a counterclaimant
should have the option of either pursuing its counterclaims in the original action or
voluntarily dismissing those claims withoutprejudice in those cases where the plaintiffs
original claims against the counterclaimant are no longer pending.
II. The Court Should Reject 4Life's Argument That Nu-Med's Notice
Of Appeal Was Untimely.
After Nu-Med commenced the present appeal, 4Life filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Appeal for Lack ofAppellate Jurisdiction, claiming that Nu-Med's Notice ofAppeal was not
timely filed. Although the parties had previously submitted memoranda in support of and
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in opposition to 4Life's Motion, the Court deferred ruling on the Motion, and indicated that
the parties may present their arguments in their appellate briefs. Since 4Life presented its
arguments again in its Appellate Brief, Nu-Med will likewise respond herein with its
previously stated arguments as to why its Notice ofAppeal should be deemed timely filed
and 4Life's Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
A. Nu-med's 30 Day Period for Filing its Notice of
Appeal Did Not Begin to Run Until the Trial Court
Entered its Final Order on May 1, 2006.
Nu-Med contends thatitsNotice ofAppeal (R.274-275), whichwas filed onMay25,
2006, was filed well within the required 30 day period which did not begin torun until May
1,2006. Rule 4ofthe Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure states that anotice ofappeal "shall
be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealedfrom." (emphasis added).
The order from whichNu-Medhas taken this appeal is the Order that was enteredby
the trial court on May 1,2006 which granted 4Life's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(treated as amotion for summary judgment) and dismissed all ofthe claims asserted in Nu-
Med's Complaint with prejudice and on the merits. (R. 269-271). Since Nu-Med's Notice
ofAppeal was filed approximately 25 days later on May 25, 2006, and clearly within the
allotted 30 day period, Nu-Med's Notice ofAppeal should be deemed timely, and 4Life's
motion to dismiss the appeal should be denied.
4Life, however, argues that the Court should completely ignore the May 1,2006 Order
which 4Life itselfprepared and submitted to the Court for approval. Instead, 4Life urges this
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Court to focus solely on the April 17, 2006 Minute Entry (R. 266-67) as the "judgment or
order" which triggered the 30 day period, in which case Nu-Med's Notice of Appeal would
have been filed approximately one week after the expiration of the 30 day period. 4Life's
arguments are based on a recent Utah Court of Appeals opinion that was filed just a few
weeks before the Order dismissing Nu-Med's claims was entered in this case. See Code v.
Utah Department ofHealth. 2006 UT App. 113; 133 P.3d438; 548 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (March
23, 2006).!
As will be discussed more fully in Section II below, Nu-Med contends that the
standard adopted by the Utah Court of Appeals in Code is inconsistent with Rule 7 of the
Utah Rules ofCivil Procedure, and inconsistent with prior opinions issued by this Court, and
therefore, this Court should either overrule or clarify Code to bring it in conformance with
Utah law. Even if Code is affirmed, however, Nu-Med contends that several key facts
distinguish this case from Code, and that even under the standard adopted in Code, it would
still be the trial court's May 1, 2006 Order that triggered the commencement of the 30 day
period for the filing of Nu-Med's Notice of Appeal.
The facts in Code involved a situation where appeal was taken after the trial court
dismissed the appellant's complaint in response to a 12(b)(6)motion. The court granted the
motion to dismiss by way of a "memorandum decision" entered on January 10, 2005, and
1 As noted in 4Life's Appellate Brief, Code v. Utah Department of Health is currently
under certiorari review by this Court. If Code is reversed by this Court, 4Life's arguments would
be rendered moot, and the Court should deny 4Life's Motion to Dismiss the Appeal without
further review. As noted herein, however, even if Code were to be affirmed, 4Life's Motion to
Dismiss should be denied.
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which expressly stated: "For the reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claim."
Id at 14. Sometime later, the appellant submitted a proposed order of dismissal that
essentially reiterated what was stated in the trial court's memorandum decision. That
proposed order was entered by the trial court on February 25, 2005, and appellant filed her
notice ofappeal on March 8, 2005. Id at ffl[4-5. The appellant maintained that the 30 day
period for filing her notice of appeal should have been calculated from the date of the
February 25, 2005 order. The Utah Court of Appeals disagreed, however, concluding that
the 30 day period commenced on the date ofthe January 10, 2005 memorandum decision,
and therefore, dismissed the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction since the notice ofappeal was
filed well after the 30 day deadline. Id at 1ffl3-7.
In reaching its decision, the Utah Court ofAppeals cited to the standard previously
established by this Court which stated that "[f]or ajudgment to be final and start the time for
appeal to run, there must be a judgment which is definite and unequivocal in finally
disposing ofthe matter." Idat f3(emphasis added) (quoting Utah State Bldg.Bd. v. Walsh
Plumbing Co.. 16 Utah 2d 249; 399 P.2d 141, 144 (1965)). The Utah Court of Appeals
referred to the express language in the memorandum decision where the trial court stated that
"[f]or the reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claim," and concluded based
on that language that "[t]he parties' substantive rights in this case were definitively and
unequivocally determined by the Memorandum Decision; the decision's unambiguous
language was clearly intended to end the litigation." Id at H1f3-4 (emphasis added). Based
on its determination that the January 10, 2005 memorandum decision included express
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language which definitively and unequivocally terminated the litigation, the Utah Court of
Appeals concluded that the 30 day period for filing a notice of appeal commenced with the
entry of that memorandum decision, and not the later order which, in the court's opinion,
"did not alter the substantive rights of the parties in any way; it did nothing more than
reiterate the dismissal already fully effectuated by the Memorandum Decision." Id at 114-7.
While the memorandum decision at issue in Code included express language
dismissing the plaintiffs claims and terminating the litigation, the Minute Entry in the
present case did not include a similar pronouncement dismissing Nu-Med's claims and
terminating the litigation, and therefore, the holding in Code would not apply to this case.
Noticeably absent from the trial court's April 17, 2006 Minute Entry is any language
referring to a dismissal of claims or termination of the litigation. Such language was,
however, included by 4Life in its proposed Order that was entered by the trial court on May
1, 2006. In that May 1, 2006 Order, after indicating that 4Life's "Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings - treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment - is GRANTED," and that Nu-
Med's "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED," the Order expressly stated:
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Complaint filed by PlaintiffNu-Med USA, Inc. in the above referenced matter
against Defendant 4Life Research, L.C., including all claims assertedtherein,
be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS.
(emphasis added). Thus, this Order, when entered by the trial court on May 1,2006, included
additional substantive language which expanded the scope of the trial court's ruling from
what was stated in the April 17, 2006 Minute Entry. Most notably, the May 1, 2006 Order
15
included key language which "definitively and unequivocally" dismissed Nu-Med's claims
in theirentirety and terminated the litigation.
Prior to the entry of the May 1, 2006 Order, a third party who was attempting to
determine the status of the litigation would not have been able to determine solely from a
review ofthe April 17, 2006 Minute Entry whether there were still any remaining claims
pending between the parties or other issues that needed to be resolved. The Minute Entry
would simply inform the third party that Nu-Med's motion had been denied and 4Life's
motion had been granted. Itwas only after the trial court expressly stated in the May 1,2006
Order that Nu-Med's Complaint, "including all claims asserted therein, be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS," that athird party could know that Nu-Med's
claims had been dismissed in their entirety, and that the litigation was terminated. Therefore,
even under the standard applied by the Utah Court ofAppeals in Code, Nu-Med's time for
filing its Notice of Appeal would not have commenced until May 1, 2006.
Another distinguishing factor between the present case and Code is the strict
compliance by the parties in this case with the requirements of Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules
ofCivil Procedure. Rule 7(f) addresses the preparation of"Orders" by the trial courts and
parties, and in subparagraph 7(f)(2), the rule states as follows:
[Ujnless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within
fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties aproposed
order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed
order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing the
order shall file the proposed order upon being servedwith an objection or upon
expiration of the time to object.
16
The appellant in Code attempted to argue that her time for filing a notice ofappeal did
not commence with the trial court's initial memorandum decision because the later order
submitted to the court was a further action that was required by Rule 7(f)(2). The Utah Court
of Appeals rejected this argument, however, at least partly due to the fact that the parties in
Code had not complied with the procedure set forth in Rule 7(f)(2). Code. 2006 UT App.
113; 133 P.3d 438; 548 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 at 16 and n.2. The Court of Appeals noted that it
was actually the appellant, rather than the "prevailingparty", that had prepared and submitted
the proposed order to the trial court, and that the proposed order had not been submitted
within fifteen days after the trial court's decision as required by Rule 7(f)(2).
In the present case, however, the parties complied precisely with the procedure set
forth in Rule 7(f)(2). 4Life, as the prevailing party, prepared the proposed Order and sent
it to Nu-Med's counsel just two days after the April 17,2006 Minute Entry. Nu-Med did not
file any type of objection to the proposed Order, and shortly after the expiration of the five
day objection period, 4Life submitted the proposed Order to the trial court for final approval
and entry by the court. Upon receipt of this proposed Order, and having received no
objection from Nu-Med, the trial court entered the final Order on May 1, 2006.
Since the parties and the trial court in the present case followed the exact procedure
for the preparation and entry of a final judgment as established by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and since it was not until the entry ofthat final Order on May 1,2006 that the trial
court made a "definite and unequivocal" statement dismissing Nu-Med's Complaint in its
entirety and terminating the litigation, it should be concluded by this Court that Nu-Med's
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time for filing its Notice ofAppeal did not commence until May 1, 2006.
B. Code Is Inconsistent with the Requirements of Rule
7(f)(2) and Contrary to Prior Precedent.
While Nu-Med contends that the present case is sufficiently distinguishable from
Code to justify adenial of4Life'sMotion to Dismiss the appeal solely on that basis, Nu-Med
also contends that the Court should either overrule or clarify Code to bring it into conformity
with Rule 7(f)(2) and the prior decisions of this Court.
As noted above, Rule 7(f)(2) expressly states that "unless otherwise directed by the
court, the prevailing party shair prepare and submit aproposed order to the trial court
reflecting the court's decision. The Rule does not suggest that this is an optional procedure
or that aparty "may" submit aproposed order, but rather uses the term "shalV\ thereby
making it clear that this procedure is mandatory in all circumstances except where the trial
court expressly directs otherwise. Thus, pursuant to this plain language, in those cases where
the trial court is silent as to whether it wants the parties to submit aproposed order, or in
other words, the trial court has not "otherwise directed" the parties, then the parties are
obligated by Rule 7(f)(2) to go through the additional process of preparing and submitting
"a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision."
In Code, however, where the trial court was silent in its memorandum decision as to
the issue of whether the parties needed to submit a proposed order, the Utah Court of
Appeals appears to be suggesting that this procedure is not mandatory. According to the
Utah Court of Appeals:
When the court issues its own Memorandum Decision, which explicitly and
unambiguously dismisses the underlying claim without inviting submission of
a further order, it leaves nothing more to be done. Such clear action by the
trial court necessarily serves under rule 7(f)(2) as direction from the court that
the prevailing party need not draft an order, and thus renders the Memorandum
Decision final and appealable.
Code. 2006 UT App. 113; 133 P.3d 438; 548 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 at 16. In other words,
according to Code, silence by the trial court on the issue of whether a proposed order needs
to be submitted is now to be interpreted as "direction from the court that the prevailing party
need not draft an order," even though Rule 7(f)(2) reads to the contrary.
This apparent contradiction between the standard adopted in Code and Rule 7(f)(2)
was at least acknowledged by one of the Utah Court of Appeals judges in Code. Judge
McHugh, in a concurring opinion, agreed that "the interaction between the two can lead to
confusion for practitioners," and stated that she is "sympathetic to the difficulty in assessing
the proper moment when the decision becomes final for purposes of appeal when the trial
court is silent on that issue." Id. at H11 -13. In light of this concern, Judge McHugh stated
as follows:
Because the procedure set forth in rule 7(f) may lull practitioners into the
mistaken belief that a decision of the trial court does not become final for
purposes ofappeal until an order is entered, clarity in the initial memorandum
decision is essential. I believe the better practice for all concerned is for the
decision to state expressly either that "no further order is necessary" or that the
prevailing party "shall prepare an order implementing this court's decision."
Id. at 112. While Judge McHugh appears to recognize the potential confusion arising from
parties having to choose between inconsistent requirements, and also recognizes the wisdom
behind having the trial judge explicitly state whether or not an order from the parties is
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required, she fails to acknowledge that the express language ofRule 7(f)(2) already accounts
for those situations where the trial judge remains silent by stating simply that "unless
otherwise directed by the court" the parties "shall" submit aproposed order.
The Utah Court ofAppeals attempts to suggest in Code that the standard it followed
in that case was consistent with the prior decisions of this Court, citing to prior cases where
minute entries and memorandum decisions have been deemed to be final orders for purposes
of filing anotice of appeal. While it is true that thisCourt has recognized that under certain
circumstances, asigned minute entry or memorandum decision can constitute afinal order
or judgment for purposes of appeal, it important to note that there are no prior cases
identified where this Court has ruled that the time for filing anotice of appeal runs from an
earlier minute entry or memorandum decision rather than alater order that was entered
pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2). In fact, Nu-Med contends that there are prior decisions from this
Court that are to the contrary.
in r MP. rosily. Tncv. AM, 707 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1985), this Court was faced with
ascenario where an appellant had filed his notice of appeal "after the trial court entered its
minute entry on August 11,1982, but before the official judgment was entered on September
23, 1982." Id at p. 1304. Under those facts, the Court concluded that the notice of appeal
was -prematures but also concluded there was no prejudice as aresult of the premature
filing. 14 at 1305. The Court's conclusion that such afiling would be premature seems to
be consistent with the current requirements of Rule 7(f)(2), but contrary to the standard
adopted in Code.
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In other prior decisions, this Court has cited the actions of the parties and the trial
court in submitting and entering a final order as evidence that neither the parties nor the court
intended a prior decision from the trial court to have been the final appealable order or
judgment. For example, in Swenson Assoc. Architects. P.C. v. State of Utah. 889P.2d415
(Utah 1994), this Court considered the issue of whether a signed minute entry should be
deemed the final order for purposes of appeal in that case, or whether the time for appeal
should have commenced with a subsequent order which the plaintiff claimed was "simply
superfluous". While the Court acknowledged that under "appropriate circumstances, a
signed minute entry may be a final order for purposes of appeal," the Court reiterated the
limited nature of those circumstances, stating:
However, such treatment is appropriate only where "the ruling specifies with
certainty a final determination of the rights of the parties and is susceptible of
enforcement." It must be clear that that "which is offered as the record of a
judgment is really such and not an order for a judgment or a mere
memorandum from which the judgment was to be drawn.
Id. at 417 (internal citations omitted). The Court noted that in its prior decision in Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg. 103 Utah 414, 419; 135 P.2d 919, 921 (1943), it "held
that a minute entry signed by the trial court stating that 'the within entitled matter having
been by the court taken under advisement, the court now renders its decision that judgment
be entered against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant,' was not itself a final order."
Swenson 889 P.2d at 417 (internal citation omitted).
The Court ultimately concluded that under the facts presented in Swenson. the time
for appeal commenced with the later order that had been submitted by the parties and entered
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by the trial court, and not the earlier minute entry. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
expressly noted that the parties and the trial court "obviously" considered the later order to
be the final appealable judgment because otherwise, there would have been no purpose in
submitting and entering the later order. Id at 417. In support ofthis conclusion, this Court
citedback to an even earlierUtahSupreme Courtdecision in UtahState Bldg. Bd.v. Walsh
Plumbing Co.. 16 Utah 2d 249; 399 P.2d 141 (1965), where the Court had faced a similar
issueand reached a similarconclusion. In WalshPlumbing,the Court rejecteda defendant's
claim that the final appealable order was apretrial order which had expressly dismissed the
opposing party's claims with prejudice, stating:
Under the circumstances here shown such a pretrial order does not meet the
above stated requirement ofa final judgment. It seems obvious that neither
the parties nor the court soregarded it, otherwise there would have been no
purpose in entering thefinaljudgment which was entered on April 2,1964,
andfrom which the appeal was taken on time.
399 P.2d at 144-145 (emphasis added).
In the present case, it likewise seems "obvious" that neither 4Life, Nu-Med, or the
trial courtconsidered thetrial court'sApril 17,2006Minute Entry to bethe final appealable
order, and that all parties involved believed asubsequent order still needed to be entered in
order to comply with the requirements ofRule 7(f)(2). If4Life truly believed that the April
17, 2006 Minute Entry was the final appealable order as it is now claiming, then why did
4Life go to the effort of preparing and submitting the additional proposed Order?
Furthermore, if the trial court had considered its April 17, 2006 Minute Entry to be the final
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appealable order, it could have rejected 4Life's proposed Order, thereby making it clear to
the parties that the April 17 Minute Entry was the final order. Instead, however, the trial
court simply entered 4Life' s proposed Order, thereby further indicating that it did not intend
its prior Minute Entry to be the final order.
As noted in the Section 11(A) Argument above, the parties in this case and the trial
court complied exactly with the requirements of Rule 7(f)(2) in preparing, submitting, and
entering the May 1, 2006 Order. It seems somewhat disingenuous for 4Life to now suggest
that it was only acting "[o]ut of an abundance of caution" when it sent the proposed Order
to Nu-Med for review and later submitted the proposed Order to the trial court. (See 4Life
Motion to Dismiss Appeal Memo, at p. 6,118). There was nothing in the cover letters sent
by 4Life to Nu-Med's counsel and the trial court with the proposed Order which suggested
that 4Life thought the proposed Order was an unnecessary step.2 To the contrary, these
letters to Nu-Med's counsel and the trial court clearly demonstrate that 4Life was following
the step by step requirements set forth in Rule 7(f)(2), and the trial court likewise complied
with those requirements when it entered the Order on May 1, 2006. While Nu-Med did not
take any affirmative actions in this process, it was not required to under the provisions of
Rule 7(f)(2) since it did not have any objections to 4Life's proposed Order.
Given the parties exact compliance with Rule 7(f)(2), it would be extremely unfair to
nowpenalize Nu-Med for relyingon 4Life's initiationof this process, and thinking that this
2 Copies of these letters were attached as Exhibits 1and 4 toNu-Med's Response in
Opposition to 4Life's Motion to Dismiss which was filed with this Court on July 18, 2006.
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final step needed to be completed before the case could be considered appealable. Even if
the April 17 Minute Entry originally could have qualified as afinal appealable order, the
Court should conclude that 4Life waived its right to make the arguments now being advanced
when it decided to initiate the process ofpreparing and submitting the proposed Order,
thereby leading Nu-Med to believe that there were additional steps remaining to fully
terminate the litigation and make the case ready for appeal.
Nu-Med submits that the rules of civil and appellate procedure should not be
interpreted such that practitioners, by complying with the requirements of one rule, may be
lulled into a failure to comply with another rule, especially when the consequences of the
non-compliance result in the complete dismissal of claims. Unfortunately, that is the
situation that the Utah Court of Appeals has created with the standard adopted in Code.
While Nu-Med contends that the present case is distinguishable from Code, and
therefore not subject to adismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, Nu-Med believes
this Court should nevertheless take the opportunity to either overrule or clarify Code in order
to bring the law back into conformance with this Court's prior decisions, and to clearly
establish the procedures which practitioners and parties are to follow when taking acase up
on appeal. While it would be nice if trial courts would always explicitly state whether its
decisions are to be followed-up with aseparate order from the parties, that unfortunately is
not always the case. Since the express language ofRule 7(f)(2) seems to accommodate for
those situations where the trial court remains silent, the most obvious solution seems to be
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to simply allow the parties to follow the procedure set forth in Rule 7(f)(2), while making it
clear that when this procedure is followed by the parties, the time for appeal does not begin
to run until the procedure has been completed and the final order has been entered by the
Court. In the present case, that would mean that Nu-Med's time for filing its notice ofappeal
did not begin to run until May 1,2006, and therefore, Nu-Med's Notice ofAppeal would be
deemed timely since it was filed on May 25, 2006.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and for those reasons stated in Nu-Med's opening Brief,
Nu-Med respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment
against Nu-Med and remand this case so that Nu-Med can continue to pursue its claims.
DATED this U day ofMay, 2007.
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